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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellant enumerates seven separate issues for appeal, however, those issues can
generally be grouped according to the two orders from which he appeals. The first order
is the trial court's order granting summary judgment to LaVerkin City. (Appellant's
Issue Nos. 1, 2, 3,4, and 5.) Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, "[i]n deciding whether summary judgment was appropriate,
[this Court] need review only whether the trial court erred in applying the relevant law
and whether a material fact was in dispute" Pinetree Assoc, v. Ephraim City, 2003 UT 6,
l|ll,67P.3d462.
The second is the trial court's order denying Appellant's motion to set aside the
order granting summary judgment. (Appellant's Issue Nos. 6 and 7.) "Utah appellate
courts review a trial court's denial of a motion for relieffromjudgment under rule 60(b)
for abuse of discretion." Rukavina v. Sprague, 2007 UT App 331, <f2. "The outcome of
rule 60(b) motions are rarely vulnerable to attack." Fisher v. Bvbee, 2004 UT 92, f7, 104
P.3d 1198.
PRESERVATION.

Appellant does not include, with respect to each issue he raises,

a citation to the record showing preservation in the trial court or a statement of grounds
for seeking review of issues not so preserved, as required by Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah
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Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), (B). This is significant
because (as set forth in more detail below), a number of the issues he raises on appeal
were not sufficiently preserved in the trial court and are therefore waived on appeal.
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rules that are of central importance to this appeal are Rules 7, 56, and 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The pertinent provisions of each of these rules is set forth
verbatim in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
This case arises from an ongoing zoning dispute between appellant Robert Stevens

and LaVerkin City. The City took action against Stevens by not renewing his conditional
use permits and revoking his business license, thereby preventing him from operating an
illegal salvage business from his property. Instead of appealing the City's action through
the administrative appeals process, Stevens sued the City in district court for inverse
condemnation. He also sought injunctive relief. The City counterclaimed and sought its
own injunctive relief to prevent Stevens from illegally operating his business.
The trial court held a hearing and denied each party's request for injunctive relief.
Thereafter, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. Stevens failed to timely
respond and the trial court granted the motion. Stevens appealed the summary judgment
ruling and also filed a Rule 60(b) motion to have summary judgment set aside. The trial
court denied Stevens' Rule 60(b) motion. Stevens timely appealed that ruling.

STG 22978.8
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This Court ordered consolidation of both appeals.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

PRE-LITIGATION BACKGROUND1

In late 1998 or early 1999, Plaintiff/Appellant Robert Stevens purchased certain
real property located at 95 South State Street in LaVerkin City. (R. 417 %l; 44611.) The
property was zoned by the City as "General Commercial." (R. 418 f9; 447 ^9.) When
Stevens purchased the property, his stated intent was to operate a business for the repair
of damaged vehicles, including the acquisition, repair, and sale of damaged (salvaged)
vehicles. (R. 417 %L\ 446 TJ2.) This intent was disclosed to members of the LaVerkin
City Council. (R. 417f3; 446f3.)
On June 2, 1999, Stevens went before the City Council requesting "preliminary
conditional use approval for an auto body shop and used car dealership at 95 South
State." (R. 417 f4; 447^4.) Discussion centered around concerns related to parking and
screened fencing, after which the City Council granted preliminary approval of Stevens'
proposed business. (R. 417 Tf4; 447 <|4.)
On January 5, 2000, the City Council voted to issue Stevens a conditional use
permit and a business license for "an auto body repair shop" "on the condition that the
[City's] sewer requirements were met." (R. 417-18 ^[5; 447 ^|5.) The conditional use

1

The facts as set forth under this subsection are identical to the undisputed facts
placed before the trial court on summary judgment in the City's memorandum in support
of its motion for summary judgment. These facts essentially mirror the undisputed facts
the trial court found in its injunction ruling.

STG 22978.8

3

permit contained no other express conditions. (R. 418 | 5 ; 447 ^5.) It also contained no
expiration date. (R. 41815; 447 f5.) Although the City Council voted to issue the
conditional use permit, Stevens never physically received it. (R. 418 %6; 447 1{6.)
Shortly after the vote, Stevens commenced business at the property under the name
"Keystone Repair." (R. 418 f7; 447 f7.)
In early 2002, Stevens purchased another parcel of real property in the City. (R.
418 f 8; 447 <||8.) This second parcel was located at 160 South State and, like the property
at 95 South State, was zoned "General Commercial." (R. 418 ^[9; 447 1J9.) Shortly after
purchasing this new property, Stevens erected an opaque, paneled fence on the same and
began to store vehicles there that would eventually be taken for repair at the 95 South
State property. (R. 418 1J10; 447-48 ^flO.) According to Stevens, he obtained informal
verbal approval from City officials to utilize the new property in this manner. (R. 419
1|10; 448 TflO.)
At a January 7, 2004 City Council meeting, Stevens sought and obtained a
conditional use permit to use thefrontportion of the property at 160 South State as a used
car lot for vehicles that were refurbished at the 95 South State property. (R. 4191J11; 448
1fl 1.) The City Council granted a six month conditional use permit for "[n]o more than
20 re-furbished cars[.]" (R. 419 1}11; 448 Ifl 1.) At the meeting, citizens complained to
the City Council about visibility problems caused by vehicles that Stevens had parked
along the 100 South side street of his 95 South State property. (R. 4191J12; 4481J12.)
At its September 1, 2004 meeting, the City Council approved an additional six
month conditional use permit for Stevens to continue using the 160 South State property
STG_22978.8
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as a used car lot. (R. 419 ^[13; 448 f 13.) Stevens was present at, and participated in, this
meeting. (R. 419 f 14; 448 Tfl4.) Stevens never appealed any of the conditions imposed
at the meeting to the City's board of adjustment. (R. 419 ^[15; 448 ^15.)
On October 13, 2004, the City held a joint work meeting of its City Council and
planning commission, primarily discussing concerns arising from vehicles parked on and
around Stevens5 two properties. (R. 420 ^[16; 448 ^fl6.) Participants indicated their
understanding that Stevens originally had been approved to use the 95 South State
property only for an auto body repair shop, and that his use of the property to store and
refurbish wrecked vehicles was unauthorized. (R. 420 ^[16; 448-49 lfl6.) The group also
discussed safety issues related to the parking of Stevens' vehicles on 100 South, and
participants stressed that children travel that street on their way to school. (R. 420 f 16;
449 ^|16.) The City Council also discussed plans to repair and potentially widen 100
South, which would require condemning and compensating Stevens for a portion of his
95 South State property. (R. 420 ^16; 449 Tfl6.)
Though other concerns were discussed, the central theme of the concerns was that
the expanding number of vehicles on and around Stevens' properties created an unsightly
and unsafe situation that the City neither contemplated nor approved. (R. 420 ^17; 449
f 17.) The discussion ended with the City Council resolving to make Stevens' continued
operation of his business conditional on his satisfaction of several requirements related to
parking on and usage of the property. (R. 420 ^[17; 449 ^|17.)
On December 15,2004, after Stevens failed to comply with certain of the
conditions imposed at the October 13,2004 meeting, the City Council held a review
STG 22978.8
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hearing to consider revocation of the conditional use permit issued to Stevens on January
5, 2000. (R. 420-21 1J18; 449 f 18.) Stevens was present and participated in this hearing.
(R. 421119; 449 ^fl9.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the City Council determined not
to revoke the conditional use permit, but to modify it by converting it to a temporary, sixmonth conditional use permit, with additional conditions. (R. 421 Tf20; 449 ^20.) The
City issued the modified 95 South State conditional use permit on or about January 7,
2005. (R. 421 Tf21; 449 H20.) Stevens never appealed any of the conditions of the
modified conditional use permit to the City's board of adjustment. (R. 421 ^|22; 450
121.)
The City thereafter determined that its plans for 100 South, including the widening
of the road, might reduce the distance between the street and Stevens' building at 95
South State so much that the building would be non-compliant with certain zoning
regulations and the City might have to condemn all or part of the property. (R. 421 ^[23;
450^23.)
The City then concluded that its ownership of the 95 South State property would
resolve the zoning concern as well as ongoing concerns regarding the property's
appearance and adverse effects on public safety. (R. 421-22 f24; 450 f24.) For that
reason, the City Council determined to enter into negotiations with Stevens for the
acquisition of his 95 South State property. (R. 421-22 ^24; 450 f24.) The City and
Stevens then engaged in discussions about the City potentially purchasing the 95 South
State property. (R. 422 f25; 450 ^25.) In the meantime, the zoning disputes continued.
(R. 422; 450.)
STGJ22978.8
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On June 1, 2005, the City conducted a review hearing to consider revocation/nonrenewal of Stevens' 160 South State conditional use permit based upon Stevens' noncompliance with conditions imposed on Stevens' use of the 160 South State property. (R.
422^25; 450 f25.) Stevens was present at the hearing. (R. 422 f26; 450 TJ26.)
At the conclusion of this hearing, the City Council found that Stevens was not in
compliance with the conditions of his conditional use permit and voted to revoke/not
renew the same. (R. 422 ^}27; 450 f27.) Stevens did not, at any time, appeal the
revocation/non-renewal of this conditional use permit to the City's board of adjustment.
(R. 422128; 4511[28.)
On August 17, 2005, the City conducted another review hearing, this time to
consider the revocation/non-renewal of Stevens' modified 95 South State conditional use
permit based upon Stevens' non-compliance with conditions of the same. (R. 422 ^[29;
451 f29.) Stevens was present at this hearing, and he presented evidence in support of
his position that the modified conditional use permit should not be revoked. (R. 422 f30;
4511J30.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the City Council found that Stevens remained
in non-compliance and voted to revoke/not renew the modified conditional use permit.
(R. 422-23 1J30; 451 f30.) As with the City's other zoning actions, Stevens did not
appeal this action to the City's board of adjustment. (R. 423 f31; 451 Tf31.)
Although the City had revoked/not renewed the conditional use permits for both
the 160 South State and 95 South State properties, Stevens continued to conduct business
operations from both properties and purchased a number of flood-damaged vehicles,
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which were to be transported to, stored at, and repaired or otherwise processed at his two
properties. (R. 423 f32; 451132.).
By December 2005, after months of negotiations, the City and Stevens had been
unable to reach an agreement regarding the City's purchase of the 95 South State
property. (R„ 423 f33; 451 ^33.) Specifically, a professional appraisal company hired by
the City but chosen by Stevens, estimated that just compensation for the 95 South State
property would be $300,000.00. (R. 423 1f34; 451 f34.) In a letter dated December 30,
2005, the City, through its special legal counsel, Heath Snow, offered to purchase the 95
South State property from Stevens "for full appraised value plus and [sic] additional
$10,000.00 for [Stevens'] moving expenses." (R. 423 Tf35; 452 135.) The offer was
contingent upon Stevens removing his 'Vehicles, parts and other items of personal
property to a location outside of the municipal boundaries of LaVerkin." (R. 423-24 135;
4521(35.) Stevens did not accept the offer. (R. 424-25 137; 452136.) Since the failure
of these negotiations, the City no longer has an interest in obtaining either of Stevens'
properties. (R. 427 148; 453 146.)
In a letter dated January 5, 2006, months after the City had revoked Stevens'
conditional use permits, LaVerkin's City manager sent Stevens notice that, as a result of
Stevens' continued non-compliance with the City's zoning ordinances, the City did not
intend to renew his business license for the automobile repair and salvage business
located at 95 South State. (R. 425 ^[38; 452 137.) The letter provided notice that the
action would be "formally taken by the LaVerkin City Council at its regularly scheduled
meeting on January 18, 2006." (R. 425 138; 452137.)

STG 22978.8
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On January 18, prior to the scheduled hearing, Stevens filed suit against the City.
(R. 1.) That same day, the City's police chief sent Stevens a letter advising him that
because the City had revoked his conditional use permits and because his regular
business license expired on December 31, 2005, Stevens was no longer allowed to do any
business within the City. (R. 425 flO; 452-53 f39.)
That evening, as Stevens had been notified in the city manager's letter, the City
conducted a formal review hearing to consider the revocation/non-renewal of Steven's
business license. (R. 426 ^42; 453 Tf40.) Stevens was personally present at the hearing,
was represented by legal counsel, and was given the opportunity to present evidence and
argument in support of his position that his business license should be renewed. (R. 426
Tf43; 453 ^41.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the City Council voted to revoke/not to
renew Stevens' business license. (R. 426 «|44; 453 Tf42.)
Two days later, on January 20, after Stevens' employees had been observed
conducting business activities at the 95 South State property, officers from the City's
police department entered the 95 South State property and closed Stevens' business
operations. (R. 426 <[f45; 453 ^[42.) The officers posted a notice of closure and ordered
the employees to cease working and to leave the premises. (R. 426-27 ^[45; 453 f43.)
Stevens was subsequently criminally prosecuted for operating a business without a
license. (R. 4271J47; 453 f44.)
B.

THE LITIGATION

As stated, Stevens filed suit against the City on January 18, 2006. (R. 1.) The
complaint contained ninety-five separate allegations culminating in a single cause of
STG_22978.8
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action for inverse condemnation. (R. 1-13.) Stevens' complaint was a laundry list of
allegations about how he believed he had been unfairly treated by the City. (R. 1-11.)
The crux of his inverse condemnation claim, however, is contained in the following
allegations:
83.

[The] City has attempted to force [Stevens] to sell his real property
to [the] City through the use of explicit and detailed threats of both
civil and criminal prosecution.

84.

[The] City has attempted to force [Stevens] to sell his real property
to [the] City through the revocation or non-renewal of [Stevens']
conditional use permits.

85.

[The] City has attempted to force [Stevens] to sell his real property
to [the] City through the revocation or non-renewal of [Stevens']
business license.

86.

[The] City's attempts to force [Stevens] to sell his property
constitute a "taking" of private property by [the] City, ostensibly for
a public purpose.

(R. 11ffl[83-86.)In addition to filing the complaint, Stevens filed an ex parte motion for
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (R. 21-34.)2
The City answered the complaint, filed a counterclaim asserting causes of action
for injunctive relief, responded to Stevens' motion for injunctive relief, and sought an
injunction of its own to prevent Stevens from utilizing his properties as a salvage
2

Stevens sought an order restraining the City from, in his words, "using its police
powers to deny [him] a business license to continue to lawfully operate his business, from
sending police officers and other city officials or employees to harass or threaten [his]
and/or [his] employees or customers, andfromfiling complaints or reports with Utah's
Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division regarding [his] business license." (R. 21-22.) The
trial court denied the motion on the grounds that Stevens had no basis for seeking the
order ex parte without notice to the City. (R. 49-50.)
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business in violation of City code, and to prevent him from conducting business without a
license in violation of City code. (R. 53-80, 111-131.)
On April 13, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on both motions for injunctive
relief. (R. 241; R. 766 Tr. passim.) By the time of the hearing, the parties had conducted
several depositions, the transcripts of which werefiledwith the trial court at its request.
(R. 766 Tr. 6:5-8; 55:17-18, 57:1-10.) The trial court took the matter under advisement
and thereafter issued a memorandum decision denying both parties' request for injunctive
relief. (R. 415-435 [Mem. Dec. at 2-13].)3
The trial court's memorandum decision included a lengthy and detailed section of
factual findings. (R. 416-427 [Mem. Dec. at 2-13].) The trial court noted, with respect to
those findings, that "the facts presented here are drawn from either the undisputed facts
of the parties' memoranda and exhibits, orfromapparently uncontroverted deposition
testimony." (R. 416 [Mem. Dec. at 2 n.2].) The trial court ultimately determined that
Stevens' inverse condemnation claims had no legal basis and that the City's request for
injunctive relief was moot because Stevens had not conducted business at his properties
since January 20. (R. 431-433 [Mem. Dec. at 17-19].)
[1]

The City's Motion for Summary Judgment

Subsequently, the City filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting
memorandum. (R. 436-38,445-468.) In the undisputed facts section of its memorandum
3

The memorandum decision is cited specifically along with the Record page
citations as "Mem. Dec."

STG 22978.8

11

in support, the City detailed forty-six separately numbered paragraphs of undisputed
facts, which cited to and, except for minor grammatical and numbering changes, mirrored
the trial court'sfindingsin its memorandum decision denying the motions for injunctive
relief. {Compare R. 446-453 with R. 417-427.)4
On the basis of those facts, the City argued, inter alia, that Stevens failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies in appealing the revocation/non-renewal of his
permits and license and otherwise failed to timely file a petition for review in district
court challenging City's actions as required by state law. (R. 454-458.) In addition, the
City argued that Stevens' inverse condemnation claim failed as a matter of law because
Stevens had no more than a unilateral expectation of continued rights or benefits in his
business license and therefore did not have a sufficient property interest to sustain an
inverse condemnation claim. (R. 464-466.)
The summary judgment motion and accompanying memorandum was served on
Stevens' attorneys by first class U.S. mail on October 25. (R. 438, 468.) Stevens did not
file an opposition memorandum by the deadline required for response. (R. 472; R. 767.)5
4

For the Court's convenience, citations to both were provided in Subsection II.A
at pages 3-9 supra.
5

Rule 7(c)(1) requires memoranda in opposition be filed within ten days of
service. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1). Rule 6(a) provides that in calculating any period of
time less than eleven days, intervening holidays and weekends shall not be counted. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a). In addition, when a motion is served by mail, an additional three
days are added to the response time; however, weekends and holidays are included in
calculating the additional three day period unless the last day of the period is a holiday or
weekend. See Utah R. Civ. P. 6(e). By rule, then, Stevens' opposition was due by
November 13.
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As a result, on November 16, the City filed a request to submit the motion to the trial
court for decision. (R. 471-72.)
A flurry of motions and court filings followed. (R. 473-604.) On November 20,
apparently undeterred that the motion had already been submitted for decision, Stevens
filed a memorandum in opposition. (R. 473-500.) Two days later, Stevens filed a motion
to strike the City's motion for summary judgment. (R. 501.) Several days after that, on
December 1, the trial court entered an order granting the City's motion for summary
judgment. (R. 511-512.) A little over three hours after summary judgment was entered,
Stevens filed a motion to amend his complaint. (R. 509, 511,513.) Three days later the
City filed an opposition memorandum to Stevens' motion to strike along with its own
motion to strike Stevens' memorandum in opposition to its motion for summary
judgment as untimely. (R. 555.) The City also filed an opposition to Stevens' motion to
amend his complaint. (R. 604.) Though he filed several motions and other documents,
Stevens never filed an objection, a motion to amend, or any other document challenging
the sufficiency of the trial court's order granting summary judgment. (R. passim.)
On December 29, Stevens filed a notice of appeal. (R. 615.) Thereafter, on
January 11, 2007, the trial court issued orders denying Stevens' motion to strike the
City's motion for summary judgment and granted the City's motion to strike Stevens'
opposition memorandum as untimely. (R. 680-685.)6

6

The record does not contain an order disposing of Stevens' motion to amend his
complaint. However, since it was filed after summary judgment was granted, it was
{continued on next page]
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[2]

Stevens' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment

On January 9, 2007, Stevens timely filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the trial
court's order granting summary judgment. (R. 632-656.) The motion was supported by
affidavits from Stevens' attorney, Robert Avery of the law firm Ascione, Heideman &
McKay ("AHM"), and Avery's assistant, Carlyn Braithwaite. (R. 616-622.) Through
their affidavits, the following "facts" emerged. (R. 766-768 [60(b) Ruling at 2-4 &
n.2].)7
The City's motion for summary judgment and its memorandum in support were
served on October 25, 2006, and received at AHM on October 30. (R. 438, 468, 7661J2.)
At this time, AHM was renovating and expanding its offices to accommodate the hiring
of three new attorneys. (R. 766 f3.) Avery was the attorney primarily responsible for
handling Stevens' case. (R. 766 f4.) He was being assisted by Jerry D. Reynolds,
another attorney at AHM. (R. 766 ^|4.) In the course of AHM's office renovations,
Avery's office was being relocated to another floor of the building in which the law firm
was located. (R. 766^5!)
During the time he was waiting for his new office to be completed and equipped,
Avery worked from home or from temporarily vacant desks in the office. (R. 767 *|}5.)

barred as a matter of law. See National Adv. Co. v. Murray City Corp., 2006 UT App 75,
113, 131P.3d872.
n

Record references with cited paragraphs arefromthe trial court's findings of fact
on ruling denying Stevens' Rule 60(b) motion. A copy of the trial court's Rule 60(b)
ruling is attached at Addendum B.
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He also had limited access to the legal files normally in his possession. (R. 767 <|5.) At
this same time, Avery was assigned a new personal assistant, Carolyn Braithwaite. (R.
767 ^6.) Braithwaite, while admitting that AHM received the City's motion on October
30, could not recall doing anything to track the motion once it was received. (R. 767 ^7.)
It is not known whether Reynolds was facing the same issues as Avery during this time
period. (R. 767 f 8.)
In the midst of this alleged chaos, the deadline to respond to the motion for
summary judgment had come and gone. (R. 767 Tf9.) On November 20, Avery received
the City's motion and supporting papers. (R. 767 ^10.) It is not known—and Stevens
submitted no evidence to show—where the motion was from October 30, when AHM
received it, to November 20, when Avery received it, and why it took twenty days for the
motion to find its way into Avery's hands. (R. 767 Tf 11.)
Upon receiving the motion, Avery called the City's trial counsel, Heath Snow, and
requested additional time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. (R. 767 Tfl2.)
Snow, however, having waited the period of time required for an opposition
memorandum, and having received none, had already submitted the matter to the trial
court for decision. (R. 767 ^13.) On December 1, the trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of the City. (R. 7671J14.)
These facts, Stevens argued, were "significant and unusual" and amounted to
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). (R. 632.) He argued that the delay that caused
Avery to receive the City's motion only after it was too late "could only be referred to as
a near 'perfect storm' of clerical errors and other circumstances." (R. 638.) He asserted
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that AHM's office expansion and hiring of new staff was "unprecedented." (R. 638.)
This, Stevens argued, constituted excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). (R. 638-641.)
In addition, he argued that it constituted "any other reason justifying relief under Rule
60(b)(6) because it would deny Stevens a trial. (R. 641-642.)
The City opposed the motion arguing that the facts did not support relief under
Rules 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6). (R. 708-716.) On January 23, Stevens9 replaced Avery and
AHM with new legal counsel. (R. 705-706.) His new counsel filed a reply
memorandum, a request to submit, and requested a hearing on the motion. (R. 741-742.)
The trial court summarily denied Stevens' motion to set aside without holding a hearing.
(R. 749.) Stevens then filed a request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(R. 752-753.) In response, the trial court issued a detailed ruling denying Stevens' Rule
60(b) motion, including factual findings, legal analysis, and conclusions. (R. 765-773
[60(b) Ruling, Addendum B].)
Ultimately, the trial court simply did not agree that AHM's office renovations and
the hiring of a new assistant created a "perfect storm." (R. 769 [60(b) Ruling at 5].)
Specifically, the trial court, reasoned:
[Stevens] has described ordinary challenges in day to day business at a law firm.
As a result, the Court is not persuaded that these are circumstances that were
beyond [Stevens'] control. Nor is the Court persuaded that a person acting
prudently and with due diligence under similar circumstances would not have been
able to respond to the motion for summary judgment within the time frame
required by rule. [Stevens] submitted no evidence of having taken any precautions
to avoid or minimize the challenges the AHM firm claimed to be under as a result
of its office renovations.
In short, [Stevens] admits to receiving the motion for summary judgment on
October 30th. What happened to it for the next twenty days—until it ultimately
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found its way to Mr. Avery—is a mystery to the Court. [Stevens] has failed to
provide this Court with reasonable justification for his failure to timely oppose
[the City's] motion for summary judgment.
(R. 769 [60(b) Ruling at 5].)
The trial court also rejected Stevens' claim argument that the judgment entered
against him should be set aside under Rule 60(b)(6). (R. 770 [60(b) Ruling at 6].) The
trial court reasoned that Stevens' proffered reason for relief under 60(b)(6) was nothing
more than "a general statement that he should have the right to have his dispute decided
on the merits." (R. 771 [60(b) Ruling at 7].) Moreover, the trial court was not impressed
by Stevens' failure to provide the correct legal standard under Rule 60(b)(6), as well as
his failure to provide it "with any argument or authority as to why the circumstances in
this case are so unusual and exceptional as to justify [the trial court's] granting relief for a
reason that must be 'sparingly invoked.'" (R. 771 [60(b) Ruling at 7].) Accordingly, the
trial court denied Stevens' Rule 60(b) motion. (R. 772 [60(b) Ruling at 8].)
Stevens also appeals from that ruling. (R. 790.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the
City and its order denying Stevens' motion to set aside summary judgment for the
following reasons.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

1.

Stevens failed to timely oppose the City's motion for summary judgment.

A trial court is justified in entering summary judgment when a summary judgment
motion is not opposed. This Court should summarily affirm on this basis.
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2.

Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and corresponding

case law require that a non-moving party set forth in his response to a motion for
summary judgment specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. What a non-moving
party cannot do is attempt to create disputed issues of material fact for the first time on
appeal. Stevens failed to file any opposition to the City's motion and therefore did not
attempt to dispute any facts before the trial court. Thus, this Court can ignore his claims
that there are disputed issue of material fact requiring reversal of summary judgment.
Furthermore, even if this Court were to entertain his claimed factual disputes, it does not
operate to reverse summary judgment because the facts he attempts to dispute are not
material to the underlying claim for inverse condemnation.
3.

Summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. Stevens' lawsuit is

an inverse condemnation action. His asserted property right is his real property. He
claims that the City's revocation of his permits and licenses, i.e., its regulation of his
property, has cost him money. Yet, he does not argue and has not submitted any
evidence to show that this regulation has left his properties economically idle, thereby
triggering a right to just compensation. Further, it is undisputed that Stevens did not
appeal any of the City's land use decisions concerning his conditional use permits, or its
decision to revoke his business license. As a result, he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies and his inverse condemnation claim is not ripe.
Additionally, while Stevens spends a great deal of time portraying himself as the
victim of the City's alleged "arbitrary and capricious" actions, and claiming that the City
violated his due process rights in its actions, it is irrelevant to an inverse condemnation
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claim. An inverse condemnation claim seeks compensation for authorized governmental
action. Where the government acts in an unauthorized manner, as Stevens alleges in his
complaint, the takings clause is not triggered. He has effectively alleged and argued
himself out of his own claim.
4.

The City's citation to and reliance on the trial court's factual findings from

its injunction ruling does not constitute reversible error. While findings on a preliminary
injunction ruling do not have a preclusive or binding effect at a subsequent trial on the
merits, there was no argument that the trial court'sfindingswere binding and preclusive
on summary judgment. Rather, if Stevens had evidence to dispute those facts, he could
have put that evidence forward and it would have prevented summary judgment
regardless of where the City had derived its statements of fact.
5.

Stevens also asks this Court to reverse the trial court because, Stevens

claims, its summary judgment order was not sufficiently detailed. However, Stevens did
not preserve this argument as grounds for reversal by objecting to, submitting a motion to
amend, or otherwise calling the trial court's attention to the alleged deficiency of its
order. Therefore, he barred from raising this issue on appeal.
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

6.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Stevens relief

from summary judgment. Stevens provided no evidence below to show or otherwise
persuade the trial court that "a person acting prudently and with due diligence under
similar circumstances would not have been able to respond to the motion for summary
judgment within the time frame required by rule." (R. 769 [60(b) Ruling at 5].) What
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Stevens described were routine back-office problems that can occur in any law firm. The
trial court did not err in refusing to recognize Stevens' claimed "perfect storm" as a
sufficient excuse under Rule 60(b)(1). Furthermore, Stevens fails to demonstrate that the
conduct of his prior attorneys was "deplorable" enough to warrant relief under Rule
60(b)(6). In fact, he recognizes that his description of the conduct he claims warrants
relief is not substantiated by the record. Therefore, his Rule 60(b)(6) fails.
7.

Finally, the trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing to grant a

hearing on Stevens9 Rule 60(b) motion because it was not a dispositive motion. Far from
ending the litigation or any claim in the litigation, the motion merely sought to and would
have put all the claims back on the table and ensured further litigation.
ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT AS
A RESULT OF STEVENS' FAILURE TO TIMELY OPPOSE THE CITY'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.
Stevens concedes that he did not timely file a memorandum in opposition to the

City's motion for summary judgment. (Appellant's Br. at 22.) He also does not appeal
the trial court's order granting the City's motion to strike his untimely opposition
memorandum. As a result, there is no opposition of record to the City's motion.
A trial court is justified in entering summary judgment when the motion for
summary judgment is not opposed. See Haycock v. Estate of Haycock, 2000 UT App
347U at para. 2 (citing Thermidor v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr.. 683 F. Supp. 403, 414
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Plaintiffs failure to respond to defendant's motion for summary
judgment in a timely manner constitutes an independent ground for granting defendant's
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motion")); see also Utah Local Government Trust v. Wheeler Machinery Co., 2007 UT
App 513, Y7 n.5, 154 P.3d 175 (noting that Rule 56(e) itself "provides that summary
judgment shall be entered when an appropriate response is not filed"), cert granted, No.
20070084-SC (Utah Apr. 27, 2007). On this basis, this Court should summarily affirm
the trial court.
H.

THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT
PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

A Party Cannot Attempt To Create Disputed Issues Of Material Fact
For The First Time On Appeal.

Even if this Court does not summarily affirm the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, it should summarily reject Stevens' attempt to create disputed issues of
material fact for the first time on appeal.
The briefing of summary judgment motions is governed by Rules 7 and 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 7(c)(3)(A), "[e]ach fact set forth in the
moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless controverted by the responding party." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). See also
Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, Iflfl 1-12, 156 P.3d 175. To controvert a fact,
the non-moving party must "provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute,
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials."
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). This is also set forth in the plain language of Rule 56(e),
which requires a non-moving party to set forth in her "response . . . specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added).
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The reason for requiring the response to a summary judgment motion specify, with
appropriate citation to relevant materials, disputed facts is because any other rule would
require the trial court to become the advocate for the non-moving party, searching the
entirety of the record on its own to determine whether there is any scrap of evidence that
might create a disputed issue of material fact precluding summary judgment—regardless
of whether the opposing party cited to such evidence. This is an unsound proposition that
has been uniformly rejected by courts that have examined the issue. See, e.g.. Amnesty
America v. Town of West Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (Rule 56 "does not
impose an obligation on a district court to perform an independent review of the record to
find proof of a factual dispute"); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist, 237 F.3d
1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[i]f a district court must examine reams or file cabinets
full of paper looking for genuine issues of fact, as though the judge were the adverse
party's lawyer, an enormous amount of time it taken away from other litigants"); Adler v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding "where the burden to
present such specific facts by reference to exhibits and the existing record is not
adequately met below, we will not reverse a district court for failing to uncover them
itself').8
Out of necessity, Stevens takes a different view. Recognizing his lack of
opposition, Stevens relies on Frisbee v. K&K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah
Because Utah's rule 56 is identical to federal rule 56, this Court looks "freely to
federal authorities in interpreting" Utah's rule 56. LeVanger v. Highland Estates Prop.
Owners Ass'n, 2003 UT App 377,1J12, 80 P.3d 569.
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1984) for the proposition that a non-moving party can sit on his hands, do absolutely
nothing, let summary judgment be entered against him, and then challenge the summary
judgment by asserting, for the first time on appeal, that there are disputed issues of
material fact. Other than showing that "there is usually a case somewhere that provides
comfort for just about any claim[,]" Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2606 (2007), this
expansive reading of Frisbee is incorrect and would swallow whole Rules 7 and 56 and
the entire body of case law that requires that issues raised on appeal first be preserved in
the trial court.
In Frisbee, the Utah Supreme Court merely repeated what it had long held, that a
party opposing summary judgment is not required to proffer affidavits to show a disputed
issue of material fact if the movant's affidavits on their face show disputed issues of
material fact. See 676 P.2d at 390. See also Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983) (stating "when a party opposes a properly supported motion
for summary judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary
materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court may properly conclude that there are no
genuine issues of fact unless the face of the movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses the
existence of such an issue")).
What the Utah Supreme Court did not hold in Frisbee, and what Frisbee has never
been relied upon, or cited for, by our appellate courts, is that arguments concerning
disputed issues of material fact need not be preserved in the trial court. Rather, as is
shown by recent case law, if a party desires to create a dispute as to a material fact, he
must first do so before the trial court or he waives the ability to raise the issue on appeal.
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See Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, ^{15, 155 P.3d 900; Smith v. Hales
& Warner Constr., Inc., 2005 UT App 38, fl n.l, 107 P.3d 701. See also Reed v. Nellcor
Puritan Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding "[b]y failing to file a
response within the time specified by the local rule, the nonmoving party waives the right
to respond or to controvert the facts asserted in the summary judgment motion").
This preservation requirement applies even where the competency of an affidavit
supporting summary judgment is questionable under Rule 56(e) standards. See Pinetree
Assocs. v. Ephraim City, 2003 UT 6, f 19, 67 P.3d 462 (stating "[fjormal or evidentiary
defects in an affidavit in support or opposition to a motion for summary judgment are
waived in the absence of a motion to strike or other objection"); Franklin Fin., 659 P.2d
at 1044 (precluding challenge to sufficiency of summary judgment affidavit where not
raised first to trial court). Contrary to Stevens' assertions, it also applies regardless of
whether there are evidentiary problems on the face of an affidavit or "in the recitation of
supposedly uncontested facts in [the moving party's] memorandum of points and
authorities submitted in support of the motion." D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420,
421 (Utah 1989) (holding same and collecting similar cases). Stevens' reading of
Frisbee, cannot be squared with the governing rules of civil procedure and this body of
case law. And this Court should reject his invitation to allow trial courts to be
sandbagged by unadvertised factual issues on summary judgment.
In sum, Stevens failed to respond to the City's summary judgment motion.
Therefore, he cannot attempt to create a disputed issue of material fact for the first time
on appeal. As a result, this Court should dismiss out of hand the arguments and claims
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made at pages 22-28 of Stevens' brief, claiming that there are disputed issues of material
fact, and at pages 29-31, claiming that there were disputed issues of material fact in the
City's memorandum in support.
B.

Stevens' Laundry List Of "Disputed Facts" Are Either Unsupported
By The Summary Judgment Record, Not Disputed Facts At All, Or
Not Material To His Underlying Claim.

To be sure, even if this Court is willing to entertain Stevens' attempt to create
disputed issues of material fact for the first time on appeal, it will not provide grounds for
reversal because Stevens' laundry list of "disputed facts" are either unsupported by the
summary judgment record, not disputed facts at all, or not material to his underlying
claim.
[1]

"[W]e are confined to the disputedfacts that were properly before
the trial court " Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UTApp 11,
W6, 155 PM 900.

First, in his attempt to create disputed issue of material fact, Stevens merely picks
through the record and attempts to argue about what he alleged and the City disputed, or
what the City alleged and he disputed. (Appellant's Br. at 23-39.) In Stevens' view,
however, the "record" is simply random and scattered papers, documents, and pleadings,
including depositions filed at the injunction hearing and "other pieces of evidence before
the court[.]" (Appellant's Br. at 22-23.) Given enough time, any litigant could pick
through the pleadings, documents, and other items contained within a trial record and
create a list of what one party alleges and the other disputes. If this was all that was
required, summary judgments would never survive appeal. However, this misapprehends
the record on a summary judgment motion.
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In reviewing summary judgment, the appellate court only considers documents
and evidence properly before the trial court on summary judgment, i.e., before the trial
court in the summary judgment briefing. See Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co.. 813
P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991). As this Court stated recently, "in the context of summary
judgment, we are confined to the disputed facts that were properly before the trial court."
Heideman v. Washington Citv, 2007 UT App 11, ^{16, 155 P.3d 900. "Properly," in the
context of summary judgment, means compliance with the requirements of Rule 7 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) ("[t]he motion,
memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7").
Stevens fails to demonstrate that any of the "facts" he claims are in dispute were
actually presented to the trial court on summary judgment. Therefore, this Court should
reject his claims out of hand.
[2]

Several of Stevens' claimed disputed issues of fact are legal
arguments masquerading as disputed "facts. "

Second, much of what Stevens argues fails to focus on actual facts. Rather, he
focuses on legal arguments. These arguments include whether he had the right to appeal
the modification of his conditional use permit (Appellant's Br. at 25) and whether the
City was required to give specific notice of how to appeal its decisions on his license (at
26-27).
"Factual questions are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as
things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing or taking place, as well as the
subjective, such as state of mind." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994),
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modified in part by State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096. "Legal determinations,
on the other hand, are defined as those which are not of fact but are essentially of rules or
principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar
circumstances." Pena, 869 P.2d at 935.
Here, Stevens claims there is a dispute about whether he had the right to appeal the
modification of his conditional use permit. The undisputed fact is that he did not appeal.
The question of whether he had the right to appeal requires an interpretation of the laws
and ordinances at issue. That is a legal question. See infra at 33-37 (discussing same).
So too is the question of whether the City was required to walk him through the appeal
process. The undisputed fact is that the City did not tell him how to appeal. (R. 456.)
Whether the City was required to hold his hand through the process, however, is a legal
question. See infra at 33-37 (discussing same). Stevens' claimed dispute as to these
legal issues cannot form the basis for reversal under the guise of disputed issues of
material fact.
[3]

Stevens' "disputedfacts " are not material to the
underlying claim.

Even assuming there are disputed facts, the dispute is not relevant to the
disposition of a summary judgment motion unless the facts are material. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c). An issue of fact is not "material" unless, under the substantive law, it is
essential to the proper disposition of the underlying claim. See Horgan v. Indus. Design
Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982) (courts "do not consider the disputed issues" which
are not material to a resolution of the case); Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App 203,
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Tf6, 94 P.3d 301 ("mere existence of genuine issues of fact... does not preclude the entry
of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of the case") (citation
omitted)).
In his attempt to obtain a reversal, Stevens forgets why he sued the City—to
obtain just compensation for the City's alleged taking of his property. The disputes he
attempts to create, however, have nothing to do with whether the City has taken or
damaged his property without just compensation.
To summarize his arguments, Stevens attempts to create a dispute concerning what
his original intent was in his use of the property (Appellant's Br. at 23, 30); whether he
was operating a salvage yard in violation of ordinance (at 25); whether he complied with
the conditions imposed by the City (at 28-29); whether the City "had an interest in
obtaining either of [his] [properties" (at 31); and whether the City's decisions were
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal (at 31). He does not argue materiality of these claimed
disputes in the context of his inverse condemnation claim and the elements of that claim
as set forth in article I, section 22 of our state constitution.
Specifically, whether he was in violation of City ordinances or the conditions
imposed by the City relate to the propriety of the revocation of his permits. He does not
assert that there was a taking of his permits (or license). And, in any event, by failing to
appeal the revocation of his permits and license he gave up any legal challenge to the
propriety of the City's actions. See infra at 33-37.
Furthermore, whether the City has any interest in obtaining his properties is
irrelevant to any issue pending before the Court. The City abandoned its interest in
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obtaining Stevens' property. And, as set forth in detail below, this argument—which
entails Stevens' claim that the City engaged in a "plan of coercion" is irrelevant to and
would actually defeat Stevens' takings claim. See infra at 37-39
Finally, whether the City's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal would be a
question if this were a review of a land use decision under Utah Code section 10-9a-801.
See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(c) (Supp. 2007) ("[a] final decision of a land use
authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is supported by substantial
evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal"). Stevens, however, has
not filed petition for review or otherwise challenged the City's actual land use decisions
in district court. See id. § 10-9a-801(2)(a) (providing for review of land use decisions by
district court). Thus, whether the City's decisions were arbitrary, capricious, or illegal is
simply not a material issue to the takings claim.
In sum, Stevens' claimed "disputed facts" are not material to the underlying legal
claim and, therefore, cannot preclude summary judgment.
III.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE AS A MATTER OF LAW
BECAUSE STEVENS HAS NO LEGALLY COGNIZABLE TAKINGS
CLAIM.
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property

shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." Utah Const.
art. I, § 22. To establish a claim for inverse condemnation under article I, section 22,
Stevens must show a property interest that is taken or damaged for a public use. See
Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1990). If
he makes this showing, he is entitled to just compensation. See Utah Const, art. I, § 22.
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The property interest Stevens identifies, both in his complaint and in his brief, is
his real property. He asserts that the City's revocation of his business license and
conditional use permit, and the adoption of the City's ordinances, which he states were
"arbitrarily and capriciously enacted," affected the economic viability of his properties.
(Appellant's Br. at 32-33.)9 He also asserts that the City failed to comply with eminent
domain laws in its alleged attempt to purchase his property. (Appellant's Br. at 34-35.)
His arguments are without merit for the following reasons.
A.

Stevens Submitted No Evidence To Show A Substantial Interference
Abridging Or Destroying His Claimed Property Rights.

Summary judgment was appropriate because the City's actions did not interfere
with all economically viable use of Stevens' properties. As a general proposition, takings
claims fall into two categories: (1) physical takings and (2) regulatory takings. See View
Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MSICO. L.L.C., 2005 UT 91, p i , 127 P.3d 697. "A 'physical
taking occurs . . . when there is [either] a condemnation or a physical appropriation of
property.'" WL (quoting Phillip Morris. Inc. v. Reillv, 312 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2002)).
In contrast to a physical taking, "'[a] regulatory taking transpires when some significant
9

Stevens skirts around thefringesof claiming a property right in his business
license. (Appellant's Br. at 33.) But simply complaining about the City's revocation of
that license does not equate to a taking because it falls short of showing a protected
property interest in the license itself. Stevens would have to allege and show a legitimate
claim of entitlement to the license as opposed to a unilateral expectation that the City
would not revoke it. See Heideman, 2007 UT App 11 at ^17-19. Of course, the license
was revoked because he did not have a conditional use permit. He never properly
challenged the City's decisions on his conditional use permits and therefore any claim of
a property interest in the license suffers the same fate as his claim for taking of his real
properties.
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restriction is placed upon an owner's use of his property for which 'justice and fairness'
require that compensation be given.'" Id. Because the City never condemned or
physically appropriated Stevens' properties, his claim is appropriately categorized as a
regulatory taking claim.
For government action to constitute a regulatory taking, the regulation at issue
must substantially interfere with private property by destroying it, materially lessening its
value, or substantially abridging or destroying the owner's right in its use and enjoyment.
See id. at Tfl[30, 32. This does not mean that every regulation of real property that results
in some interference or diminished value requires compensation. See id.
Government could simply not go on if any regulation or zoning action which
diminished property value required the payment of just compensation. Cf Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A.. 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005). Rather, like the City's regulation of Stevens'
properties, "[m]any statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do with
and on the owner's property. Those regulations may have a significant impact on the
utility or value of the property, yet they generally do not require compensation under
article I, section 22." Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah 1990).
"Indeed, the police power allows government, 'without compensation,' to
'regulate and restrain the use of private property when the health, safety, morals, or
welfare of the public requires or demands it.'" View Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MSICO,
L.L.C.. 2005 UT 91 at Tf32 (quoting Colman, 795 P.2d at 627). "Regulations
promulgated under that power 'are not considered as appropriating private property for a
public use, but simply as regulating its use and enjoyment.'" Id.
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In this case it is an undisputed fact that the City's actions on Stevens' conditional
use permits came as a result of concerns related to the parking of Stevens' vehicles along
streets that created visibility and safety issues for the public generally, including children
who travel that street on their way to school. (R. 420 TJ16; 448 Tfl6.) The vehicles also
created an unsightly appearance not authorized or contemplated by the City. (R. 420 f 17;
4491fl7.) These are not mere allegations as Stevens claims (Appellant's Br. at 34), they
are undisputed facts.
Stevens argues, in conclusory fashion, that the City's actions "substantially
interfered" with his property rights and interests. (Appellant's Br. at 33.) He asserts that
he lost a "major source of income" and also claims that "the economic viability of [his]
properties was severely lessened." {Id.) Of course, there is no evidence to support this
claim. The one record citation he does provide is not of any evidence that was before the
trial court in the summary judgment record and therefore cannot be considered on appeal.
See Heideman, 2007 UT App 11 at ^|16. Stevens is simply asking this Court to do what it
was reversed for doing in View Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MSICO: assume that
there was evidence supporting substantial abridgment or destruction of a property right.
See2005UT91at1f33.
Furthermore, the "evidence" Stevens cites is his own self-serving deposition
testimony placed in the record in the course of the injunction hearing. (R. 795 Tr. 189.)
There, he testified that the revocation of his business license "cost me a lot of money."
(R. 795 Tr. 189:5.) If this was sufficient to substantially interfere with a property right,
every time a governmental authority shut down a business for violation of its ordinances
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it would have to pay just compensation to the business. Fortunately, the constitution
requires more. While arguing generally that he lost income, suffered some other losses,
and had the "the economic viability of [his] properties [] severely lessened" (Appellant's
Br. at 33) as a result of the City's regulation, Stevens never argues, nor did he allege in
his complaint, that the City's actions left his properties "economically idle[.]" Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
In other words, he does not argue or allege that the City's actions "prevent him
from engaging in any and all permissible uses" of his properties. View Condominium
Owners Ass'n v. MSICCX L.L.C., 2005 UT 91 at 1J36. For good reason, both his
properties are zoned general commercial under the City's zoning ordinances. This zone
expressly permits over thirty uses along with "[o]ther uses in harmony with those listed."
LaVerkin City Ord. § 10-6G-2. (Add. C.) It is difficult to see, and Stevens makes no
argument to show otherwise, that his properties have no other viable use than as
unauthorized salvage yards.
In sum, Stevens has not suffered a legally cognizable regulatory taking that
requires just compensation under article I, section 22.
B.

Stevens Failed To Exhaust His Administrative Remedies By Appealing
The Revocation Of His Licenses And Therefore His Taking Claim Has
Not Ripened.

Summary judgment was also appropriate because Stevens did not exhaust his
administrative remedies by appealing any of the City's actions on his licenses and
permits. Before a party may assert a regulatory takings claim, he must first exhaust his
administrative remedies. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001). This
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exhaustion requirement applies for inverse condemnation claims under article I, section
22. See B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, p 5 n.8, 87 P.3d
710 (Orme, J., dissenting), rev'don other grounds 2006 UT 2, |30 n.3,128 P.3d 1161
(noting with aipproval Judge Orme's dissent summarizing takings jurisprudence). See
also Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, f 18, 67 P.3d 466 (recognizing that
administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to assertion of state constitutional
claims). Under the exhaustion requirement, a takings claim is not ripe until the land use
authority has reached a final decision on the merits of the underlying action. See
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620; see also Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S.
725, 736-37 (1997).
In the instant case, following Stevens' refusal to comply with its condition on his
use, the City modified and revoked Stevens' conditional use permits. It is undisputed that
Stevens failed to appeal that revocation to the City's board of adjustment. Stevens claims
he was not required to make such an appeal because the City's code does not provide a
method to appeal a modification or revocation of a conditional use permit. (Appellant's
Br. at 26.) Even if, as Stevens suggests, City ordinance did not specifically state that the
board of adjustment could review a modification or revocation of a conditional use
permit, see LaVerkin City Ord. § 10-9-11 (providing for review in board of adjustment of
"the decision to grant, grant with conditions or deny a conditional use permit"), our state
land use code fills the gap.
State statue provides that if a municipality fails to enact an ordinance establishing
an appeal of a land use decision, the adversely affected party has ten days to appeal that
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decision to the municipality's "appeal authority." Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9a-704(l), (2)
(Supp. 2007). The "appeal authority" is "the person, board, commission, agency, or other
body designated by ordinance to decide an appeal of a decision of a land use application
or a variance." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-103(2) (Supp. 2007). In LaVerkin City, the
appeal authority is its board of adjustment. See LaVerkin City Ord. Chap. 4.
Stevens never appealed to the board of adjustment. Not once. If the City's action
in revoking or modifying his conditional use permit was in error, the board of adjustment
was in a position to correct that error. If the board of adjustment could have corrected the
error, then Stevens may have his conditional use permits. If he had his conditional use
permits, he may have a business license. If he had a business license he would not have
suffered the damages he alleges and the takings clause would not be implicated. Stevens'
failure to follow this remedy, however, has deprived him of a final decision and a final
determination on the correctness of the City's actions. It is therefore fatal to his inverse
condemnation claim. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620-21.10
The same is true of his business license. See LaVerkin City Ord. Chap. 8
(providing appeal procedure). Stevens concedes he did not appeal that decision through
the administrative appeals process but argues instead he did not have to because the City
never told him how. (Appellant's Br. at 26-27.) In support of this argument, he relies on
languagefromthe plurality opinion in Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d
10

Even if there was no further appeal to the board of adjustment, the same analysis
would apply because Stevens failed to petition the district court for review of the City's
decisions under Utah Code section 10-9a-801. As a result, there still would be no final
decision.
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598 (Utah 1980). His reliance on Worrall is misplaced. In Worrall the Utah Supreme
Court was interpreting due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See id. at 601. The plurality11 relied on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306 (1950) and its progeny to support their position that the civil
service commission was required to specifically inform the plaintiff how to appeal the
administrative decision. See Worrall 616 P.2d at 601-602 (plurality opinion).
More recently, however, the United States Supreme Court limited the Mullane line
of cases and held that where state-law remedies are available and established through
published and generally available statutes and case law, a citizen is obligated to turn to
these public sources and determine for himself what remedial procedures are available to
him. City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999). See also Atkins v.
Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130-131 (1985) ("[a]ll citizens are presumptively charged with
knowledge of the law... [t]he entire structure of our democratic government rests on the
premise that the individual citizen is capable of informing himself about the particular
policies that affect his destiny").
As a result, the plurality opinion in Worrall lends no support to Stevens' claim that
ignorance of the law is an excuse to his failure to appeal. Rather, as Justice Hall
recognized, there is no rule that requires an adverse party to notify a plaintiff about
11

The reasoning of a plurality is not binding precedent. See State v. Anderson,
910 P.2d 1229, 1234 n.5 (Utah 1996) (noting that plurality opinions "represent[] the
views of only two justices of this court and [are] therefore not the law of this state");
State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the analysis
contained in a plurality opinion is "not binding").
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applicable time limits or "outline for him the appropriate response to make." Worrall
616 P.2d at 603 (Hall, J., dissenting, joined by Crockett, C.J.). The United States
Supreme Court has now vindicated Justice Hall's view.
LaVerkin City Ordinances are published and generally available to the public
through the City's offices or, like many municipalities in Utah, on-line at
www.sterlingcodifiers.com/UT/LaVerkin/index.htm. In this regard, Stevens did not find
it difficult to get copies of these ordinances to attach to his brief. (Appellant's Br. at
Add.) Further, Stevens submitted no evidence on summary judgment to show that copies
of these ordinances were not available to him.
In sum, Stevens failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and therefore his
takings claim is not ripe.
C.

Stevens Impermissibly Equates Alleged Violations Of Due Process And
"Arbitrary And Capricious" Action With A Taking Requiring Just
Compensation.

In both his complaint and in his brief, Stevens tosses out the terms "arbitrary and
capricious" and asserts that his due process rights were violated in his ongoing disputes
with the City. (Appellant's Br. at 33-36; R. 11 ^[83-86.) He apparently believes these
arguments bolster his inverse condemnation claim. However, claims of arbitrary and
capricious action and alleged violations of due process have no place in a takings
analysis.
Government cannot exercise its power of eminent domain arbitrarily or
capriciously. See Salt Lake County v. RamosellL 567 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1977).
Therefore, a plaintiff cannot premise an inverse condemnation claim on alleged arbitrary
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and capricious conduct because—as its name implies—an inverse condemnation is an
action to obtain just compensation from government when government has taken or
damaged property for public use without formally exercising its eminent domain power.
See Farmers New World Life, 803 P.2d at 1243; B.A.M. Dev.. 2004 UT App 34 at |35
n.8 (Orme, J., dissenting).
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.. 544 U.S. 528 (2005), the United States Supreme
Court clarified this issue, holding claims that allege violation of due process and related
analyses are inconsistent with, and have no place in a takings analysis. The Court made
clear that the takings clause only "requires compensation where government takes private
property 'for public use' It does not bar government from interfering with property
rights, but rather requires compensation 'in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking."9 Id. at 543 (emphasis original) (quoting First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315
(1987)). On the other hand, "if a government action is found to be impermissible—for
instance because it fails to meet the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary as to
violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can
authorize such action." Id.
Thus, although Stevens spends a great deal of time complaining and arguing about
whether the City's actions—its negotiations with him over the potential purchase of his
property, the enactment of its ordinances, or the manner in providing him an appeal—are
arbitrary and capricious or otherwise violate his due process rights, it is ultimately
irrelevant to his inverse condemnation claim. Indeed, if the City is guilty of all these
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things, then Stevens has no claim for inverse condemnation and summary judgment must
be affirmed because the City's action would not be a lawful exercise of governmental
authority and no inverse condemnation claim would arise. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543;
Ramoselli. 567 P.2d at 183.
D.

Stevens Cannot Maintain An Inverse Condemnation Action For
Alleged Threats To Get Him To Sell His Property.

Stevens' final argument is that summary judgment was not appropriate because
the City, he claims, did not follow Utah Code section 57-12-13 in its negotiations with
him. (Appellant's Br. at 37.) Instead, Stevens argues, the City attempted to get him to
sell his property through coercion and threats. There are several problems with this
argument. First, there is no competent evidence on summary judgment that supports it.
Second, the City did not purchase his property; it did not exercise its power of
eminent domain; and it no longer has any interest in acquiring his property. Stevens cites
no authority for the proposition that he can maintain an inverse condemnation action
based on a City's failed and abandoned attempt to acquire property. Carrying his
argument to its conclusion, Stevens wants a trial on the merits of an inverse
condemnation action concerning property the City has never taken from him. This is not
a basis to reverse the trial court.
IV.

THE CITY'S CITATION TO THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
FACTUAL FINDINGS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Stevens next argues that summary judgment should be reversed because, he

claims, the City inappropriately cited to and relied on the trial court's factual findings in
its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. (Appellant's Br. at 38STG_22978.8
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39.) We agree, as a general proposition, that findings of fact and conclusions of law
resulting from a preliminary injunction ruling do not have a binding, preclusive effect in
the subsequent trial of the case on the merits. See Centro de la Familia v. Carter, 2004
UT 43,1fi|4-5, 94 P.3d 261. However, this general proposition does not warrant reversal
of summary judgment.
The City never asserted that Stevens was barred from challenging the factual
findings made following the injunction hearing on summary judgment. The City never
asserted that any of the factual findings or conclusions of law made in the injunction
ruling were binding or preclusive. The City merely put the trial court's findings that
supported its injunction ruling forward as facts that the City believed were undisputed for
purposes of summary judgment. (R. 446.)12 If Stevens had evidence to dispute those
facts, he could have put that evidence forward and, assuming it was competent under
Rule 56(e) and created a dispute of material fact, he could have prevented summary
judgment regardless of the course of the City's statement of facts. See Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). Thus, in the context of this summary judgment motion, Stevens' argument is
erroneous and does not provide a basis for reversing the trial court.

1 *y

It is not difficult to understand why the City put those facts forward as
undisputed on summary judgment. The trial court had noted, with respect to those facts,
that "the facts presented here are drawn from either the undisputed facts of the parties'
memoranda and exhibits, or from apparently uncontroverted deposition testimony." (R.
416 [Mem. Dec. at 2 n.2].) Thus, regardless of whether the City relied on those findings
and repeated them almost verbatim in its memorandum in support, Stevens had all but
conceded that they were undisputed.
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V.

STEVENS DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CHALLENGE TO THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RULING.
Stevens next argues that the trial court should be reversed for failing to give a

written statement of grounds for its order granting summary judgment. (Appellant's Br.
at 39.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, Stevens did not preserve this argument
as grounds for reversal by objecting to, submitting a motion to amend, or otherwise
calling the trial court's attention to the alleged deficiency of its order. "In order to
preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way
that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home
Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, |14,48 P.3d 968 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). This includes placing a trial court on notice of any
claim that its ruling is not sufficiently detailed. See 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc.,
2004 UT 72, H152-54, 99 P.3d 801.
The reason for requiring this notice is exemplified in the context of this case.
When the trial court issued its initial ruling denying Stevens' Rule 60(b) motion without
explanation, Stevens objected and filed a request for specific findings and conclusions.
(R. 749, 752-753.) Having been alerted and placed on notice to this issue, the trial court
subsequently, and in response to Stevens' objection and request, issued specific findings
and conclusions. (R. 765-773.) Unlike the Rule 60(b) ruling, Stevens never alerted the
trial court to any alleged problem with the sufficiency of its summary judgment ruling;
therefore, Stevens deprived the trial court of the opportunity to correct the alleged error.
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As a result, Stevens waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court's summary
judgment ruling. See 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72 at H1J52-54.
Second, even though the City's motion for summary judgment was based on
multiple grounds and the trial court's ruling did not state on what basis it granted
summary judgment, that alone does not constitute a basis for reversal. See Retherford v.
AT&T Comm.. 844 P.2d 949, 958 n.4 (Utah 1992) ("failure to issue a statement of
grounds is not reversible error absent unusual circumstances"). The issues before the trial
court were not complex, and, as set forth above, in light of the procedural posture of the
case and the resolution of the parties' requests for injunctive relief, there was only one
issue remaining for the trial court to address: Stevens' inverse condemnation claim.
In this regard, while Stevens focuses his attention on the language of the trial
court's ruling, he provides no explanation about how the issues were so complex that this
Court is left with no choice except to remand for clarification. See, e.g., Gabriel v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App 277, ^[10, 34 P.3d 234 (reversing only because court was
"unable to square the trial court's ruling with the various arguments asserted in the City's
motion"). A remand here to require more detail from the trial court would ensure only
one thing—that after the trial court provides more detail, this case will come right back to
this Court for resolution of the issues that this Court can easily resolve here and now. In
the interests of judicial economy, this Court should dismiss Stevens' argument and
instead rule on the substantive issues in this appeal. See Granite Credit Union v. Remick,
2006 UT App 115, Tf9, 133 P.3d 440.
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VI.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO DENY
STEVENS' MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Stevens next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant

him relief from summary judgment under Rules 60(b)(1), for excusable error, and
60(b)(6), for the alleged gross negligence of his prior attorneys. He, like many, begins
his argument with an attempted resort to the "liberal application" language in Rule 60(b)
cases implying that any result other than granting the Rule 60(b) motion is an abuse of
discretion. However, those cases are in the context of a default judgment. See Menzies
v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81,1J63,150 P.3d 480 (collecting cases that discuss application of
Rule 60(b) in context of default judgment). This was not a default judgment. It was a
summary judgment. Relief from an order granting summary judgment does not require
liberal application from the trial court. Rather, the trial court need only grant relief under
Rule 60(b) in limited circumstances. See Rukavina v. Sprague, 2007 UT App 331 at ^3.
And, as stated by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he outcome of rule 60(b) motions are
rarely vulnerable to attack." Fisher v. Bvbee, 2004 UT 92, ^[7, 104 P.3d 1198. Against
this backdrop, the trial court should be affirmed.
A.
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Concluding That
Renovating An Office And Hiring A New Assistant Do Not
Demonstrate Excusable Neglect Under Rule 60(b)(1).
Stevens first seeks relief under the excusable neglect component of Rule 60(b)(1).
The Utah Supreme Court has defined "excusable neglect" under 60(b)(1) as "the exercise
of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini
Spas v. Indus. Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987).
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Stevens argues that he demonstrated excusable neglect because, he asserts, his
former attorneys, Avery and AHM, exercised due diligence and that but for
"circumstances beyond his control" he would have timely filed a memorandum in
opposition to summary judgment. (Appellant's Br. at 43.) He then describes the utter
"chaos" that AHM experienced because of its office renovations and hiring new staff.
(See id. at 43-44.) This, Stevens argues, is due diligence.
The trial court saw it differently. It reasoned that what Stevens had described was
nothing more than "ordinary challenges in day to day business at a law firm." (R. 769
[60(b) Ruling at 5].) In fact, contrary to Stevens assertions on appeal concerning the
precautions that AHM allegedly took to prevent this from happening, the trial court
stated: "[Stevens] submitted no evidence of having taken any precautions to avoid or
minimize the challenges the AHM firm claimed to be under as a result of its office
renovations." (R. 769 [60(b) Ruling at 5]) (Emphasis added.) The trial court was simply
not "persuaded that a person acting prudently and with due diligence under similar
circumstances would not have been able to respond to the motion for summary judgment
within the timeframerequired by rule." (R. 769 [60(b) Ruling at 5].)
The trial court summarized its decision as follows: "In short, [Stevens] admits to
receiving the motion for summary judgment on October 30th. What happened to it for
the next twenty days—until it ultimately found its way to Mr. Avery—is a mystery to the
Court. [Stevens] has failed to provide this Court with reasonable justification for his
failure to timely oppose Defendant's motion for summary judgment." (R. 769 [60(b)
Ruling at 5].)
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(1).
"Routine back-office problems . . . do not rank high in the list of excuses for defaults."
Pretzel & Stouffer v. Imperial Adjusters, Inc., 28 F.3d 42, 46 (7th Cir. 1994). Neither
does an attorney's failure to respond to a motion, even if the attorney is preoccupied with
other matters. See Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-Energy Sys., 803 F.2d
1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 1986).13 Were the rule otherwise, there would be no need to
impose deadlines. Adopting Stevens' argument about what constitutes excusable neglect
under Rule 60(b)(1) would render the briefing requirements of Rule 7 meaningless and
suggest that any excuse for failing to timely respond to a motion would provide sufficient
grounds to grant relief from the judgment entered as a result of that motion. This cannot
be the law.
Stevens has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to grant relief from summary judgment under Rule 60(b)(1).
B.

The Conduct Of Stevens' Attorneys Does Not Warrant Relief Under
Rule 60(b)(6).

After asserting Avery and AHM exercised due diligence, Stevens next argues they
were grossly negligent and disregarded his interests, which, he asserts, entitles him to
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes
the setting aside of a final judgment "for any other reason justifying relief from the

13

Because Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is nearly
identical to Utah's Rule 60(b)(1), federal interpretations of the rule are considered by this
Court as persuasive authority. See Rukavina, 2007 UT App 331 at ^4 n.4.
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operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). "Rule 60(b)(6) is the 'catch-all'
provision of rule 60(b)." Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at f71. As such, Rule 60(b)(6) "may not
be relied upon if the asserted grounds for relief fall within any other subsection of rule
60(b)." IcL In other words, relief under 60(b)(6) is "exclusive of the grounds for relief
allowed under other subsections." Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, "relief under rule
60(b)(6) is meant to be the exception rather than the rule[,]" and therefore should be
"'sparingly invoked' and used 'only in unusual and exceptional circumstances.'" Id.
fquoting Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1307-08 (Utah 1982)).
Stevens' argument for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) fails for two reasons. First, this
argument was not sufficiently preserved below. As stated in the trial court's decision,
[Stevens'] proffered reason is a general statement that he should have the
right to have his dispute decided on the merits. He does not state the
correct legal standard under Rule 60(b)(6), nor does he provide the Court
with any argument or authority as to why the circumstances in this case are
so unusual and exceptional as to justify this Court's granting relief for a
reason that must be "sparingly invoked."
(R. 771 [60(b) Ruling at 7].) See also R. 641-642 (Stevens' Rule 60(b)(6) argument
below.) To preserve an argument for appeal, a litigant must present the trial court with
argument and authority and provide the trial court with the first opportunity to rule on
that issue. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). Stevens
did not do so here. This Court should summarily affirm on that basis.
Second, Stevens has not met the standard for granting relief under 60(b)(6).
Stevens attempts to equate Avery and AHM's conduct to the conduct of the attorney in
Menzies. In Menzies, the Utah Supreme Court called the attorney's representation
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"deplorable," 2006 UT 81 at f24, and included a lengthy and detailed description of this
representation, substantiated by a lengthy and detailed record. See id. at ^24-48, 53.
Avery and AHM's conduct cannot even remotely be described as "deplorable." And
Stevens knows it.
Stevens states, "the record does not accurately reflect the true nature of [Avery and
AHM's] negligence." (Appellant's Br. at 46.) He goes on to argue that Avery and AHM
misled him, failed to keep him informed, and failed to communicate with him.
(Appellant's Br. at 46.) Unfortunately for Stevens, however, the record does not
substantiate his claims. It is a well-settled rule that an appellate court will not consider
assertions that are not substantiated by the record. See Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v.
Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985) (stating "our review is of course limited to the
evidence contained in the record on appeal"). As a result, this Court cannot consider any
of the unsubstantiated conduct alleged and described by Stevens in his brief in
determining whether Avery and AHM's representation of him warranted relief under
Rule 60(b)(6). That spells the end of his argument. Without more, all that has been
described is conduct that belongs solely within the confines of Rule 60(b)(1), and is not
therefore appropriately considered under 60(b)(6). See Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at ^[71.
The trial court should be affirmed.
VII. A RULE 60(b) MOTION IS NOT A DISPOSITIVE MOTION THAT
REQUIRES A HEARING UNDER RULE 7(e).
Stevens' final argument is that the trial court committed reversible error by not
granting him a hearing on his Rule 60(b) motion. He is wrong. Rule 7(e) of the Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure requires trial courts to grant a request for a hearing only where
the motion at issue is dispositive. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e). In cursory fashion, Stevens
asserts that a Rule 60(b) motion is a dispositive motion. It is not.
A dispositive motion is a motion that "would dispose of the action or any claim or
defense in the action[.]" Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e). Stevens' Rule 60(b) motion to set aside
the summary judgment would not have disposed of this action or any claim or defense in
this action. Rather, the motion merely could have put all the claims back on the table and
ensured further litigation by setting aside the summary judgment which ended the action.
Because the motion was not dispositive, the trial court was "afforded great
latitude" in determining whether to hold a hearing on the motion. Utah County v. Butler,
2006 UT App 444, fl9, 147 P.3d 963, cert granted, No. 20070009-SC (Utah Mar. 15,
2007) (certiorari granted to address other issues). Stevens cites no authority and makes
no substantive argument to support his claim that the trial court abused its considerable
discretion in not granting a hearing on the Rule 60(b) motion. Therefore, the trial court
did not commit reversible error when it did not hold a hearing on the motion.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court.
Respectfully submitted this JjJ> day of October 2007.

Bryan Jf Pjattison
DURHAM70NES & PlNEGAR, P.C.

192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St. George, Utah 84770
Heath H. Snow
BINGHAM & SNOW, LLP

230 North 1680 East, Suite D-l
St. George, Utah 84790
Attorneys for Appellee LaVerkin City
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
In accordance with Utah R. App. P. 26(b), I certify that on October s* > , 2007,1
caused two (2) copies of the BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LAVERKIN CITY to be served upon
counsel for Appellant, via first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid, to the following
address:
Shawn T. Farris
Chad J. Utley
FARRIS & UTLEY, PC

2107 W. Sunset Blvd., Second Floor
P.O. Box 2408
St. George, Utah 84771-2408
Attorneys for Appellant
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DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rules 7(c)(3), (d), and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the
responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain
a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted,
and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of
the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an
explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set
forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and
numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a
table of contents and a table of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of
documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a
"Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date
on which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was
served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has
been requested. If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a
hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A
request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption of the document
containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under
Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the
action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or
the issue has been authoritatively decided.

1
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Rules 56(c) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an afi'iaavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend
its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

2
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT C. STEVENS d/b/a KEYSTONE
REPAIR, individually,
Plaintiff,
V.

CITY OF LaVERKIN, a Utah municipal
corporation,
Defendant.

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Proposed]

CITY OF LaVERKIN, a Utah municipal
corporation,
Counterclaimant,
v.
ROBERT C. STEVENS d/b/a KEYSTONE
REPAIR or KEYSTONE AUTO, LLC,
individually.
Counterclaim Defendant.

Case No.: 060500154
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Court, having reviewed and considered the parties' memoranda and
supporting papers, makes the following Ruling:
FINDINGS OF FACT1
1.

On October 26, 2006, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment along with

a memorandum in support.
2.

The motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support were received at

the law firm of Ascione Heideman & McKay ("AHM")—attorneys for the Plaintiff—on October
30, 2006.
3.

At the time, the AHM lawfirmwas undertaking office renovation and expansion

because it had hired three new attorneys.
4.

Robert Avery, an attorney with AHM, was the attorney primarily responsible for

handling Plaintiffs case. Jerry D. Reynolds, another attorney in the AHM firm, also appeared
with Mr. Avery on the case.
5.

In the course of AHM's office renovations, Mr. Avery's office was being

relocated to another floor of the building in which the lawfirmwas located. During the time he
was waiting for his new office to be ready and equipped, Mr. Avery worked from home or from
temporarily vacant desks in the office. He also had limited access to the legal files normally in
his possession.

These factual findings are based on the documentary evidence (affidavits) submitted by the parties in their
briefing to the Court on the motion to set aside.

6.

At this time Mr. Avery also received a new personal assistant, Mrs. Carolyn

Braithwaite.
I.

Mrs. Braithwaite, while admitting that AHM received the motion for summary

judgment on October 30th, could not recall doing anything to track the motion for summary
judgment once it was received.
8.

It is not known whether Mr. Reynolds was facing the same issues as Mr. Avery.

9.

In the midst of this, the deadline to respond to the motion for summary judgment

had come and gone.
10.

On November 20,2006, Mr. Avery received Defendant's motion for summary

judgment and supporting papers.
II.

Though the motion for summary judgment was received by the law firm on

October 30, it is not known—and Plaintiff submitted no evidence to show—where the motion for
summary judgment was from October 30 to November 20 and why it took twenty days to find its
way into Mr. Avery's hands.
12.

Upon receiving the motion, Mr. Avery called counsel for the Defendant, Heath

Snow, and requested additional time to respond to the motion for summary judgment.
13.

Mr. Snow, however, having waited the period of time required for an opposition

memorandum, and having received none, had already submitted the matter to the Court for
decision.
14.
Defendant.

On December 1, 2006, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of

15.

PI aintiff filed his motion to set aside that judgment on January 9, 2007.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

To obtain relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b), a party against whom judgment
has been entered must show: (1) the judgment was entered against him for any of the reasons
specified in Rule 60(b); (2) his motion to set aside the judgment is timely; and (3) he has a
meritorious defense to the action. See Erickson v. Schenkers Infl Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d
1147, 1148 (Utah 1994) (citing State ex. rel. Dep't of Social Servs v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053,
1055-56 (Utah 1983) (plurality opinion)).
A.

Timeliness

As an initial matter, the Court concludes that the motion to set aside was timely filed
insofar as it was submitted shortly after the final judgment had been entered and therefore within
a reasonable time as it relates to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(6) argument, and within 3 months as it
relates to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(1) argument. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
B.

Rule 60(b) Reasons

Plaintiff asserts that the judgment was entered against him for the reasons specified in
Rule 60(b)(1) and (6). The Court addresses these in turn.
1. Rule 60(b)(1)
Plaintiff first asserts that the final judgment was entered against him because of mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the judgment was entered

2

While the actions specified in Plaintiffs motion to set aside and papers in support are the actions of the
Plaintiffs attorneys (now former attorneys), the Court generally refers to them as the actions of the Plaintiff insofar
as an attorney's conduct is ordinarily attributable to the client because an attorney is acting as an agent for the client.
See Menzies. 2006 UT 81 at f76.

against him because he did not timely receive a copy of Defendant's motion for summary
judgment and supporting materials. Plaintiff argues this was the result of a "perfect storm." This
"perfect storm", as described by Plaintiff, was: (1) AHM's office renovation; (2) Mr. Avery not
having immediate access to his files; and (3) Mr. Avery hiring a new assistant, all of which
Plaintiff argues is "unprecedented."
The Court, however, agrees with Defendant's argument. Plaintiff has described ordinary
challenges in day to day business at a law firm. As a result, the Court is not persuaded that these
are circumstances that were beyond Plaintiffs control. Nor is the Court persuaded that a person
acting prudently and with due diligence under similar circumstances would not have been able to
respond to the motion for summary judgment within the time frame required by rule. Plaintiff
submitted no evidence of having taken any precautions to avoid or minimize the challenges the
AHM firm claimed to be under as a result of its office renovations.
In short, Plaintiff admits to receiving the motion for summary judgment on October 30th.
What happened to it for the next twenty days—until it ultimately found its way to Mr. Avery—is
a mystery to the Court. Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with reasonable justification for
his failure to timely oppose Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff further argues that he was unaware of Defendant's "intent" to file a motion for
summary judgment and therefore scheduled the office move in "good faith" not anticipating the
delay of delivery of office furniture and other equipment. However, the parties were in the
middle of ongoing litigation. A reasonably prudent attorney would anticipate that any motion,
including a motion for summary judgment, could be filed by the opposing party at any time.

While the excuses offered by Plaintiff may amount to neglect, Plaintiff has not
sufficiently demonstrated that they amount to excusable neglect as required under Rule 60(b)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff attempts to raise a question as to the actual date of receipt of
Defendant's request to submit, calling it a matter of importance. However, that date is irrelevant
to the timeliness of his opposition. It is undisputed that Plaintiff received the motion for
summary judgment and did not timely file a memorandum in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment as required by Rule 7(c)(1).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that the
judgment against him resulted from mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect under Rule
60(b)(1).
2. Rule 60(b)(6)
Plaintiff also asserts that the judgment entered against him should be set aside under Rule
60(b)(6) which authorizes the setting aside of a final judgment "for any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). As stated recently by the
Utah Supreme Court, "Rule 60(b)(6) is the 'catch-all' provision of rule 60(b)." Menzies v.
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, f71, 150 P.3d 480. As such, Rule 60(b)(6) "may not be relied upon if the
asserted grounds for relief fall within any other subsection of rule 60(b). In other words, the
grounds for relief under 60(b)(6) are exclusive of the grounds for relief allowed under other
subsections." Id (citations omitted). Moreover, "relief under rule 60(b)(6) is meant to be the
exception rather than the rule[,]" and should therefore be "'sparingly invoked' and used 'only in

unusual and exceptional circumstances.'" Id. (quoting Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657
P.2d 1304,1307-08 (Utah 1982)).
Plaintiffs proffered reason is a general statement that he should have the right to have his
dispute decided on the merits. He does not state the correct legal standard under Rule 60(b)(6),
nor does he provide the Court with any argument or authority as to why the circumstances in this
case are so unusual and exceptional as to justify this Court's granting relief for a reason that must
be "sparingly invoked."
Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that the judgment should
be set aside under Rule 60(b)(6).
C.

Meritorious Defense

Because the Court concludes that the judgment was not entered against Plaintiff for any
of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b), it will not and need not address the existence of a
meritorious defense. See State ex. rel. Dep't of Social Servs v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053,1056
(Utah 1983) (stating it is "unnecessary" and "inappropriate [] to consider the issue of meritorious
defenses unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been shown."); see also Board of
Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1963) (stating meritorious defense
question arises only after sufficient excuse is shown).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the Order Granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
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DATED THIS ^ d day off
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Eric A. Ludlow
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ^_

day of March 2007,1 served an unsigned copy of the

foregoing RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

[Proposed] on the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-

paid, addressed to:
Chad J. Utley
FARMS & UTLEY, PC

189 North Main Street
P.O. Box 2408
St. George, Utah 84771-2408
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Bryan Pattison
Durham Jones & Pinegar
192 E. 200 N #300
St. George, UT 84770
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CHAPTER 8
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
1-8-1: REQUEST:
Unless otherwise specifically provided in any ordinance of the city or any code adopted by
reference, a hearing before the city council may be requested by any person:
A. Who is denied or refused a permit or license by any officer, agent or employee of this city.
B. Whose permit or license is revoked, restricted, qualified or limited from that for which it was
first issued. (1982 Code § 1-411)
1-8-2: F O R M OF R E Q U E S T :
The request for hearing must be made in writing to the mayor or city clerk/recorder and made
within thirty (30) days following the date notice denying, refusing, revoking, qualifying or
restricting the license or permit is mailed by the city to the applicant or license holder at his
address as it appears on the application or license. (1982 Code § 4-412)
1-8-3: P R O C E D U R E :
A. Time And Place: Following receipt of a request for hearing, the city council shall inform the
person requesting a hearing of the time and place the hearing is to be held.
B. Witnesses; Evidence: At the hearing, the aggrieved party shall have the right to hear and
examine any witnesses the city may produce to support its decision and to present his own
evidence in support of his contention.
C. Decision Of City Council: The city council shall, within ten (10) days following the conclusion
of the hearing, in writing, inform the person who requested the hearing of the decision of
the city council. (1982 Code § 1-413)
1-8-4: NOT A D D I T I O N A L REMEDY:
This chapter shall not be construed so as to afford any aggrieved party more than one hearing
before the city council, nor shall the hearing provided in this chapter apply to any criminal
complaint or proceeding. (1982 Code § 1-414)

3-1-13: REVOCATION OR DENIAL OF LICENSE:
A. Failure To Comply; Unlawful Activities: Any license issued pursuant to the provisions of this
code or of any ordinance of the city may be revoked and any application denied by the city
because of:
1. The failure of the licensee or applicant to comply with the conditions and requirements of
this code or any ordinance of the city.
2. Unlawful activities conducted or permitted on the premises where the business is
conducted.
3. Fraud, misrepresentation or a false statement contained in the application for the license.
4. Fraud, misrepresentation for false statement made in the course of carrying on the
business.
5. Conviction of any crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
B. Notice To Licensee: Prior to the revocation of a license or denial of an application to renew
business license, the licensee or applicant shall be given a notice which shall state in
substance that the city intends to revoke the business license or deny the application to
renew, together with the reason or reasons therefor, at a regular or special meeting of the
city council (which shall be at least 10 days and not more than 30 days from the date notice
is sent), and that the licensee or applicant has a right to appear, to be represented by
counsel, to hear the evidence against him, to cross examine witnesses and to present
evidence as to why the license should not be revoked or the application denied. (1982
Code § 9-120; amd. 1998 Code)
C. Not Applicable To Businesses Not Previously Licensed: The preceding subsection shall not
apply to applications for licenses for businesses which have not previously been licensed
by the city, and such applicants need only be informed that their application has been
denied. (1982 Code §9-120)

CHAPTER 4
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 20
10-4-1: COMPOSITION:
The board of adjustment shall consist of five (5) members, of whom shall be appointed by the
mayor with the advice and consent of the city council for a term of five (5) years; provided, that
the term of the members of the first board so appointed shall be such that the term of one
member shall expire each year. Any member may be removed for cause by the city council
upon written charge and after public hearing, if such public hearing is requested. Vacancies
shall be filled for the unexpired term of any member whose term becomes vacant. The board
of adjustment shall elect a chairperson and chairperson pro tern from among its members,
whose terms shall be for one year. (Ord. 2000-05, 3-15-2000; amd. Ord. 2004-02, 1-21-2004)

10-4-2: DUTIES AND POWERS:
The board of adjustment shall have the following powers:
A. Appeals: To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there was error in any order,
requirement, decision or determination made by the administrative official in the
enforcement of this title or of any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto.
B. Exceptions: To hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of this title upon which such
board of adjustment is required to pass under provisions of this title.
C. Variances: To authorize upon appeal such variance from the terms of this title as will not be
contrary to the public interest where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of
the provisions of this title will result in unnecessary hardship; provided, that the spirit of this
title shall be observed and substantial justice done. Before any variance may be
authorized, however, it shall be shown that:
1. The variance will not substantially adversely affect the comprehensive plan of zoning and
that adherence to the strict letter of this title will cause difficulties and hardship, the
imposition of which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry out the general
purpose of the zoning plan.
2. Special circumstances are attached to the property covered by the application which do
not generally apply to other property in the same district.
3. That because of said special circumstances, property covered by application is deprived
of privileges possessed by other properties in the same district; and that the granting of the
variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial property right that is possessed by
other property in the same district. (Ord. 2000-05, 3-15-2000; amd. Ord. 2004-02, 1-212004)

10-4-3: RULES OF CONDUCT:
The board of adjustment shall adopt rules for the regulation of its procedures and the conduct

of its duties not inconsistent with the provisions of this title or of state law. Such rules, to
become effective, shall first be approved by the city council. (Ord. 2000-05, 3-15-2000; amd.
Ord. 2004-02, 1-21-2004)

10-4-4: APPEALS TO BOARD:
A. Scope: Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved or by
any officer, department, board or bureau of the city affected by any decision of the building
inspector or city manager.
B. Decision On Appeal: In exercising the above mentioned powers, the board of adjustment
may, in conformity with the provisions of this chapter, reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or
may modify the order, requirement, decision dr determination appealed from and may
make such order, requirement, decision or determination as ought to be made, and to that
end shall have all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal is taken.
C. Vote Necessary For Reversal: The concurring vote of three (3) members of the board of
adjustment shall be necessary to reverse any order, requirement or determination of any
such administrative official, or to decide in favor of the appellation, any matter upon which it
is required to pass under this title, or to effect any variation in the provisions of this title.
(Ord. 2000-05, 3-15-2000; amd. Ord. 2004-02, 1-21-2004)

10-4-5: JUDICIAL REVIEW; TIME LIMITATION:
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment may have and
maintain a plenary action for relief therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction, provided
petition for such relief is presented to the court within thirty (30) days after the filing of such
decision in the office of the board of adjustment. (Ord. 2000-05, 3-15-2000; amd. Ord. 200402, 1-21-2004)

ARTICLE G. GENERAL COMMERCIAL (C)
10-6G-1: PURPOSE:
To provide appropriate areas where commercial activities may be established, maintained and
protected. (Ord. 2006-09, 3-1-2006)

10-6G-2: PERMITTED USES:
The following shall be permitted uses within the general commercial zone:
Animal hospitals, veterinary clinics.
Automobile, truck, trailer, farm and construction equipment sales, rentals and service
stations.
Bakery, laundry, cleaning and dyeing establishments.
Building material sales yards, but not including ready mix concrete or hot mix asphalt
plants.
Business and technical schools.
Business offices and personal service enterprises.
Car dealers, new or used.
Carpenter, electrical, plumbing or heating shops; printing and publishing or lithographic
shops; furniture upholstering shops.
Clothing stores.
Commercial recreation uses, including recreational vehicle parks.
Department stores.
Entertainment sales and rental.
Garages for repair of automobiles.
Garages for storage or automobiles, commercial parking lots.
Grocery stores.
Health, fitness and beauty supply and salons.
Hotels and motels.

Light manufacturing.
Mortuaries.
Nurseries, greenhouses and fruit stands.
Office supply stores.
Offices, administrative and professional.
Public or quasi-public areas.
Public utility buildings.
Restaurants.
Retail sales.
Schools and studios for photography, art, music and dance.
Storage facilities one thousand five hundred (1,500) square feet or smaller per commercial
lot.
Accessory buildings and uses customarily incidental to the above uses.
Other uses in harmony with those listed. (Ord. 2006-09, 3-1-2006)

10-6G-3: PROHIBITED USES:
The following uses shall be prohibited within the general commercial zone:
Auto wrecking yards.
Dwellings, single-, two-, multiple-family.
Mobile home parks.
Ready mix concrete or hot mix asphalt plants.
Residential facility for the disabled.
Residential facility for youth under the age of eighteen (18).
Sexually oriented business.
Warehouses.
Other uses inconsistent with the permitted uses set forth in section 10-6G-2 of this article.
(Ord. 2006-09, 3-1-2006)

I0-6G-4: HEIGHT REGULATIONS:
slo building shall be erected to a height greater than thirty five feet (35') as measured from its
allest side or point, except that facades, rooflines and other nonoccupied building
mprovements may be constructed to a maximum height of forty five feet (45') inclusive of the
jnderlying building structure. However, the city shall not impose or restrict the height of a
structure in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person,
ncluding a religious assembly or institution, unless the city demonstrates that imposition of the
Durden on that person, assembly or institution:
^.ls in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
3.1s the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. (Ord. 200609,3-1-2006)

10-6G-5: AREA, WIDTH, AND YARD REQUIREMENTS:
District Area

Lot Width
In Feet

Front

Side

Rear

C

1/2 acre (21,780
square feet) 2

70

Setback In Feet

35 for commercial buildings
abutting SR9 and SR17;
25 when abutting city streets

See
note 1

See
note 1

Notes:
1. Side and rear setbacks shall be 10 feet where abutting a residential zone which may be
reduced, provided proper visual and sound screening, along with construction per uniform
building code, and provided drainage is not allowed to cross property lines. Maximum
height of structure shall not exceed 18 feet.
2. Commercial condominium projects shall meet the 1/2 acre minimum requirement for the
project, but buildings may be divided into subunits and platted for individual ownership
within the project.
(Ord. 2007-16,4-4-2007)

10-6G-6: SCREENING REQUIREMENT:
As a condition of any use granted under this article, an eight foot (8') block fence shall be
required when abutting a residential zone for proper visual and sound screening. (Ord. 200609,3-1-2006)

10-9-10: MODIFICATION OR REVOCATION:
The city council may modify or revoke a conditional use permit, following notice and a hearing.
A conditional use permit may be modified or revoked if the city council finds one or more of the
following:
A. The permit was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud,
B. The specific use for which the permit was granted is not being exercised; or
C. Noncompliance with conditions imposed upon said use permit. (Ord. 2004-12, 5-19-2004)

10-9-11: APPEAL OF DECISION:
Any person shall have the right to appeal the decision to grant, grant with conditions or deny a
conditional use permit. Such appeal shall be made to the board of adjustment.
Any person or entity desiring a special exception may apply to the board of adjustment in the
terms of this title as applied to zoning districts; providing a landowner relief in extraordinary
cases where the board of adjustment finds the existing special fact and circumstances
specified therein as sufficient to warrant a diversion from the general rule. Special exceptions
are not to be granted liberally. (Ord. 2004-12, 5-19-2004)

